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ROUNDTABLE: RISING POWERS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Russia and the Liberal World Order
Anne L. Clunan
In Russia today many in the foreign policy elite believe that the current liberalinternational order is in a state of systemic crisis and that  marked theyear that ended Pax Americana. They link this to the decline of U.S. relative
power, growing opposition to political liberalism, a decline in the governing capac-
ity of multilateral institutions, and a backlash against globalization. Since the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, Russian elites have struggled to find an alternative to
liberal triumphalism—some kind of international architecture that places them
within the West, yet allows them the distinctiveness of their long history as a
global rule-maker. The Russian leadership has reflexively relied on an order pre-
mised on a pragmatic realism, combined with support for patriotic nationalism at
home and abroad. While it is popular in the United States today to refer to Russia
as the revisionist power bent on overturning the existing liberal international
order, Russians respond that it is the United States—bent on a messianic quest
to spread liberalism—that has persistently disrupted the multilateral order since
the end of the cold war. There is still a contentious debate among Russian foreign
policy elites over whether the decline of U.S. hegemony bodes well for Russia’s
own continued political and economic rise, as they do not all agree on either
the terminal diagnosis of the liberal international order or the official prescription
for how to cure it. After some triumphal celebrations and not inconsiderable scha-
denfreude in , Russian foreign policy elites are now markedly more sober and
somber about the future of the international order and Russia’s place in it.
Three Liberalisms: Between International and World
Society
Three forms of liberalism exist in the web of international organizations, laws,
markets, norms, and practices that make up the world order today: post-war
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“Charter liberalism,” liberal humanism, and economic neoliberalism. As this sec-
tion will describe, Russian foreign policy elites do not oppose the first, but they do
reject the latter two, which emerged in the late s. They view these two as anti-
pluralist liberalisms, based on elevating human rights and democracy and homog-
enizing Anglo-Saxon capitalism over state sovereignty. Commitment to “hard”
sovereign statehood as a core ordering principle is one of the few commonalities
that Russian foreign policy elites share with those in Brazil, China, and India. It is
not enough to solidify these rising powers’ support for an alternative to the UN
system, as that system remains their best guarantee of the sovereignty they so
prize. Nor do Russian leaders have any clear idea of what a post-liberal order
would look like. In order to understand Russian views of a post-liberal world
order, it is necessary to review briefly the three liberalisms that coexist and collide
in the current order, and Russian experience with them.
Post-War Liberal Pluralism
International order today is constituted by the web of security and economic insti-
tutions established by the United States and its allies in the wake of two global
conflicts. This is the pluralist “Charter liberalism” of the United Nations,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade
Organization—nondiscriminatory multilateral institutions that have preserved
great-power peace and expanded prosperity for millions since . Charter lib-
eralism emphasizes “tolerance, diversity, and openness together with agnosticism
about moral truth,” but, critically, is supportive of states as the central actors
domestically and internationally. This order continues the post-Enlightenment
liberal tradition of using reason to rule force, a trend that was first adopted at
the Congress of Vienna in , and that has been used in all subsequent efforts
to ensure great-power peace and manage and limit war.
This is a state-centered order in which the great powers have established the
necessary rules of an international society—enlightened rules of coexistence that
enable the states-based-system and statehood to persist. These include the great-
power management system of the UN Security Council that sits atop the demo-
cratic General Assembly, and the secular institutions of international law, laws
of war, diplomacy, sovereignty, and nonintervention. Most critically, however,
this institutional framework bans aggressive war. To these basic rules of coexis-
tence, the world community has added a large number of rules and institutions
facilitating cooperation on additional goals, such as economic exchange, maritime
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navigation, health and safety, human rights, and sustainable development, to
name but a few. This order undoubtedly reflects and preserves the preferences
and power of the United States and other Western countries. Nonetheless, it
is engagement with this order that has enabled Brazil, China, India, Russia, and
South Africa to gain sufficient economic power to be considered rising or resur-
gent powers. This form of liberal international order is thus largely embraced by
Russia and other rising powers, as it affirms their rights as states and recognizes
that with greater power should come not only greater rights but also greater
responsibilities for maintaining global peace and prosperity. As a result, it is incor-
rect to assume that foreign policy elites in Russia and other rising powers are nec-
essarily anti-liberal, as they overwhelmingly support Enlightenment rationalism
and Charter liberalism, and they generally do not contest the rules of that system.
Two Anti-Pluralist Liberalisms and the Post–Cold War World Order
The rules of the post-war order began to be challenged in the late s with the
rise in the West of two forms of “liberal anti-pluralism” predicated on human and
economic freedoms. These two liberalisms insist that the international commu-
nity has a right, legally, institutionally, or morally, “to question seriously the dem-
ocratic and humanitarian credentials of its members” and that private nonstate
actors have rights at the international level that outweigh states’ rights to nonin-
tervention in their domestic affairs. This ushered in the current era in which the
West demands that states increasingly resemble one another internally, both polit-
ically and economically.
Beginning in the second half of the twentieth century and accelerating in the
s, a wave of liberal humanism challenged the doctrine of sovereign equality
that had enshrined states as the proper vessels of sovereignty. The international
community has increasingly elevated the legal rights of individuals against their
governments. This is not only a Western movement, as suggested by the 
creation of the International Criminal Court and the UN World Summit’s unan-
imous establishment of a state’s Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). Nor was this
done against the will of Russia and China, as the Security Council has repeatedly
reaffirmed the RtoP principle. No longer is the sovereign state system universally
accepted as a horizontal and equal society, with states unable to hold other states
accountable for domestic policies and behavior. Instead, a new hierarchy based on
political “good governance” has been established.
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The third form of liberalism gained prominence in  with the onset of the
Thatcher-Reagan neoliberal revolution. Here the mantra was “Privatize, liberalize,
and deregulate.” This led to the Washington Consensus, in which Western states,
along with the IMF and World Bank, exhorted states to give way to private actors
in governing the economy. One of the most far-reaching neoliberal reforms, the
removal of capital controls, began in the s. This freed capital to move globally,
significantly reducing state sovereignty over macroeconomic policy. By the s
the neoliberal economic ideology had largely replaced “embedded” or social dem-
ocratic liberalism as the framework for international economic order. In so doing,
it created a contest of authorities among states, their polities, and private
economic actors.
Also beginning in the s, technological advancements revolutionized
global systems of production, finance, transportation, and communications.
Multinational corporations and transnational financial markets created a new
form of global economy that is more interdependent and complex than even
the golden age of pre- capitalism. The extraordinary growth of global finan-
cial markets began to pose ever greater threats to states’ abilities to manage their
economies. As a result, “territorial sovereignty,” Richard Falk lamented in ,
has become “diminished on a spectrum of issues in such a serious manner as
to subvert the capacity of states to control and protect the internal life of society,
and non-state actors hold an increasing proportion of power and influence in the
shaping of world order.”
Many countries, including the BRICS, prospered enormously through their
partial conformity to the neoliberal economic order. However, the  Asian
financial crisis that engulfed Brazil and Russia led to widespread criticism of
the Washington Consensus and demands for a new international economic
order. That new order has yet to take form even after the  global financial
crisis shattered what was left of the West’s legitimacy to impose rules for the global
economy. It was Brazil, China, and India’s partial rather than full conformity to
the neoliberal order that largely saved them from the disastrous consequences
of the  financial crisis. When they tried to exercise their newfound economic
muscle in the World Trade Organization, however, their Development Agenda
was blocked first by the West and ultimately by their own internal disagreements.
The West meanwhile began to pursue “open” economic regionalism in the form of
megaregional trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, rather than cooperate with
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these newly strong economies under the existing global nondiscriminatory trading
order.
Russia and the Liberal International Order
Russian leaders have been a bit at sea in a world in which democratization, eco-
nomic liberalization, technological change, and increasing economic and climato-
logical interdependence have softened sovereignty, elevated nonstate actors to the
world stage, and made global security inseparable from the choices that states
make regarding human security. Since the mid-s, being unquestioningly
pro-American has been seen as unbefitting Russia’s greatness, yet Russian elites
remain essentially inclined to see Russia as part of the West. Immediately after
the collapse of the Soviet Union in December , they attempted and ultimately
rejected rapid and total domestic liberalization after a disastrous dalliance over the
course of the s. In , Boris Yeltsin forced a hyper-presidential constitution
onto a protesting parliament, using tanks to shell the parliament building. This,
combined with overt U.S. support for his reelection in , did not give
Russians a positive image of their new democratic system. From  to ,
Russia also underwent neoliberal “shock therapy” under the guidance of the
United States and the IMF. Economic liberalization produced massively underval-
ued insider privatization of state assets, hyperinflation and price volatility, and
lack of state funds to pay state employees for much of a decade. Colossal debt
led to desperate government efforts to raise foreign currency reserves, which ulti-
mately led to mass capital flight during the  Asian financial crisis, currency
devaluation, and government default. The experience permanently convinced
Russia’s new entrepreneurs and leaders to stash their wealth outside their country,
depriving Russia of much-needed funds for investment. President Yeltsin resigned
abruptly in late , leaving his designated replacement, Vladimir Putin, to
handle the fallout from this crisis.
In foreign policy, Russia’s post–cold war leaders were never quite willing simply
to take the West’s lead. They instead focused on Russia’s distinctiveness as a great
military and nuclear power, a two-continent-sized Eurasian country with vast
energy resources, and a unique multicultural civilization. Even under Putin,
most Russians today want to participate in the contemporary, Western-dominated
international society, but on their own terms—terms that were defined in the early
s, before the global dominance of liberalism. But perhaps most
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fundamentally, owing to the Soviet legacy, they reject out of hand any kind of ide-
ology as a guide to foreign policy, preferring instead pragmatic realism. In the
view of Russian policymakers, what rocked their commitment to the liberal
post–cold war order was the marriage of U.S. military power to liberal anti-
pluralism over the course of –, beginning with NATO’s intervention
in Kosovo and most recently in Libya. This was, in their view, an unprecedented,
unwarranted, and illegal overthrow of sovereignty and great-power management
—two of the fundamental rules of coexistence that make up international society.
Many Russian foreign policy experts therefore pejoratively refer to the U.S.-led
order as “collective unilateralism,” not multilateralism.
In these very fundamental ways, Russian and Western decision-makers have
significantly different understandings of the values underpinning world politics.
Today, both of the liberal anti-pluralist challenges to the pluralism of the UN
order are viewed with suspicion, if not outright hostility, by mainstream
Russian foreign policy elites, a view that is shared to a greater or lesser degree
by their peers in Brazil, China, and India. Yet it is not clear that they have an alter-
native or non-liberal world order firmly in mind.
As the preceding suggests, the question of whether it is democracy and human
rights or rather sovereign statehood that is sacrosanct will continue to produce the
deepest—and deadliest—conflict between Russia and the West. It is these issues,
together with the perceived lack of respect for Russia’s great-power status, that
have led Russia to use force repeatedly in the post–cold war era. Russian leaders
simply do not view human rights or human security as an international concern.
From the Russian perspective, the United States and its NATO allies are set on the
“further demolition of international law,” evidenced “by [the] barbaric bombing of
Yugoslavia, the separation of Kosovo, and aggression against Iraq and Libya.” As
human rights and democracy promotion are likely to continue to be the fault lines
between Russia and the West, it is worth reprising how Russia came to see them as
threats not only to the UN system but also to itself.
Russia first used force in response to the West’s liberal anti-pluralism during the
Kosovo crisis in –. From Russia’s perspective, NATO’s war against
Serbia broke every one of international society’s rules of coexistence: it ignored
Russia’s historical role as a great power and protector of the Southern Slavs, dis-
credited the Security Council great-power management system, and violated sov-
ereignty over an internal matter. When NATO’s campaign began, Russian troops
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immediately moved from Bosnia to seize the Pristina airport ahead of NATO
forces, surprising NATO commanders and delighting the Russian populace.
The conflicting worldviews between Russia and Western powers became much
more serious after the pro-democracy “colored” revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia,
and Kyrgyzstan in the early s. Whereas Kosovo challenged Russia’s status as a
global power, Western support for pro-Western forces in the former Soviet Union
denied Russia the status of even being a regional great power with exclusive rights
in its sphere of influence. Then in , at U.S. behest, NATO stated that Georgia
and Ukraine would one day join the alliance, a declaration met with fury in
Moscow. A few months later, Russia invaded Georgia, the most overtly pro-U.S.
ally in the former Soviet Union, nominally to protect the rights of Russian citizens
and prevent ethnic cleansing. Russia’s action was a war for status, a way to re-stake
its claim as a great power with special rights and responsibilities in its sphere of
influence. Russia also put the West on notice that if it could unilaterally invade
in the name of human rights, Russia could too.
In  sustained protests in Ukraine pressuring the pro-Russian president to
align with the European Union caused him to suddenly flee the country. Moscow
declared it a coup d’état orchestrated by the United States and the EU. Shortly
thereafter, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and invaded Eastern Ukraine,
again ostensibly to protect the human rights of Russian nationals. This was fol-
lowed by intervention in Syria in . According to Sergei Karaganov, a foreign
policy advisor to all three post-Soviet Russian presidents, the rationale there was
“to keep the terrorist threat as far away from Russia as possible, and to strengthen
its position in the region and the world at large. Russia’s action is quite consonant
with the spirit of the status quo power and complies with the Russian and Soviet
legalistic tradition; that is, it relies on the invitation of the legitimate government
of Syria.”
The King is Dead, Long Live the King!
It is through such reactive efforts that Russia has attempted to redefine the con-
temporary international order as an intentional great-power management system
and to cast the liberal West as a threat to that order. In its own view, “Russia
responded in the Transcaucasia and Ukraine despite its strong legalist approach
to foreign policy,” further signifying a return to a world where the “role of military
force coupled with responsible and skillful diplomacy is coming to the fore as a
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means of maintaining relative global peace.” By this definition, the United States
is an irresponsible state not worthy of being labeled a great power because of its
reckless ideological wars against sovereign nations and its heavy-handed democ-
racy promotion. Russia and China much prefer an absolutist or “hard” sover-
eignty, rather than a sovereignty contingent on good governance and a
government’s responsibility to protect the human rights of its population. The for-
mer conception situates them as major players in a hierarchy of sovereign nations,
while the latter challenges their position as full members of the sovereignty group.
Such efforts to redefine the international order as a great-power management sys-
tem, as the preceding examples suggest, will provide ample grounds for the use of
force in what Russia views as its sphere of influence and more widely in support of
sovereign governments under threat from violent nonstate actors.
Russian officialdom may have in mind the creation of a conservative interstate
order akin to the early nineteenth-century Concert of Europe system, what
Karaganov calls a “Concert of Nations.” His model would resemble the
Vienna Congress System designed to keep down revolutionary France and espe-
cially republican nationalism. The original Concert of Europe great-power man-
agement system, created in  by Great Britain and the conservative Holy
Alliance of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, is claimed to have kept the peace
among the great powers until . A new Concert of Nations, in Karaganov’s
view, could similarly keep the peace and allow economic development for a hun-
dred years if the great powers act appropriately. Greater Eurasia, jointly led by
China and Russia, would contain the radical inclinations of a U.S.-centered
West. The model relies on a grand partnership between Russia and China in
which “China will provide investment and resources, and Russia will contribute
security and geopolitical stability.” Of course, some historians question how
well and how long the original Concert truly prevented war among the great pow-
ers, as the late nineteenth century saw plenty of great-power wars fought across
four continents.
This mainstream Russian vision of international order is not necessarily illib-
eral. Indeed, it accepts the Enlightenment rationalism that calls for reason to
rule force, and to a degree it reflects the noninterventionist national liberalism
of John Stuart Mill. This vision of world order is on one hand compatible
with Charter liberalism in that it supports religious and political pluralism in a
world made up of sovereign national states free to organize and disorganize
their societies as they see fit. On the other hand, its insistence on a nineteenth-
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century version of great-power politics, in which spheres of influence are governed
by separate laws from those of the UN Charter, is incompatible with Charter lib-
eralism, though it is commensurate with U.S. and Soviet practice throughout the
cold war. Such a global order embraces “conservative realism,” Russia’s status as a
great stabilizing military power, and states as the only actors in world affairs.
When we take this model together with Russia’s renewed commitment to mul-
tilateral institutions in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific, we see a state seeking
rules-based means to govern interstate relations mainly through the addition of
new multilateral and regional institutions, not a grand plan to overthrow the exist-
ing system. Russia has recently “pivoted” to Asia in a more serious way, though its
leaders’ instincts and centuries of practice mean we still see Russia focused more on
the transatlantic region than the Pacific one. Russia is actively seeking to build a
new and institutionalized governance system for Greater Eurasia, recognizing full
well the need for institutional frameworks to manage its Asian peer competitor.
The good news is that Russia is not per se committed to geopolitics. It sees the
value of international institutions and cooperative organizations not only as a
means of building influence and allies but also and importantly as a means of coop-
erating on mutual interests and identifying and potentially resolving points of con-
flict, as well as a crucial means of limiting the use of force among great powers.
There are an impressive number of regional organizations that Russia and
China are developing in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific. While many were created
to bind Eurasian states to Russia, they embody on paper most of the liberal prin-
ciples we find in the UN system. The BRICS club and its related development
bank similarly are founded on the multilateral liberal tenets of the global develop-
ment institutions, just without the neoliberal conditionality that characterized
them until recently. And Russian liberals remain a fixture in Putin’s entourage
and government. They continue to argue that there is no profound crisis in the
existing liberal order and that Russia has much to gain from continued participa-
tion in it. Enlightenment rationalism, a “set of rules and standards of behavior
observed by all players,” and open global governance are much more desirable
for Russia than the alternative.
Would a Post-Liberal World Order Benefit Russia?
Outside the West and in Russia the softening of sovereignty brought on by glob-
alization and neoliberalism is often seen as a strategic grand plan of the United
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States to assimilate, undermine, or contain its rivals and enrich itself. In this view,
as U.S. hegemony wanes, sovereignty will automatically harden again as U.S.-style
globalization disappears. This, according to prominent Russians, will only
redound to Russia’s benefit. Russian experts recognize that their country is
not an economic great power. Putin started out in  to rectify this situation,
but his limited success to date reflects not only the difficulty the leadership has
had in creating a high-tech economy but also the Russians’ long-standing belief
that military might and a strong state are the main prerequisites for great-power
status.
Putin’s view of global economic integration stems fundamentally from eco-
nomic nationalism, or perhaps more aptly neo-imperialism. This led Putin to
adopt what Nigel Gould-Davies calls a “sovereign globalization” strategy, essen-
tially neomercantilism under the guise of economic integration, which in effect
limited economic interdependence between Russia and the outside world while
creating European dependence on Russian oil and gas. This approach succeeded
in creating a Russian middle class and a stratosphere of hyper-wealthy Russian
individuals. Economic recovery and stability are the primary sources of Putin’s
extraordinary popularity at home. The World Bank reports that “from the
– crisis until , Russia experienced nearly uninterrupted strong growth
and unprecedented gains in shared prosperity,” making Russia the sixth largest
economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity, up four places since
. Some, I believe mistakenly, even suggest that Russia has the longest staying
power of all the BRICS.
Such a vision is challenged by the few Russian foreign affairs experts who focus
on how the global political economy has enmeshed the state system. Millions of
Russians, including Putin and his powerful supporters, have benefited mightily
from Russia’s engagement with the global economy and its integration into
European markets, not to mention their use of sovereignty-free zones such as off-
shore financial havens. De-globalization, which some argue began in , puts all
this at risk. According to Aleksandr Losev, a director of the Council on Foreign
and Defense Policy (a prominent Russian think tank) and hedge-fund manager,
Russia does not come out the winner in a protectionist world in which the
United States will be able to regroup economically through its internal market
and in which “China’s imperial mission implies not only the projection of
power and extension of its influence to the periphery, but also control of the polit-
ical, economic, and information space.” Losev foresees Russia losing its political
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independence to China in the latter’s bipolar standoff with an economically
revived United States.
Moreover, Russian foreign policy elites and many Western international
relations scholars have yet to grapple with the deep-seated features of contempo-
rary capitalism that distinguish the present global economic order from previous
ones—features that have both softened sovereignty and enabled the rise of Brazil,
China, and India as economic powerhouses. Of particular importance here are
three sources of private power over states: the globalization of production (and
foreign direct investment) that has intimately linked the fates of economies in
Europe, North America, and Asia; the globalization of high-tech research and
development that has created cooperative alliances among companies in these
regions; and the enormous “shadow banking sector” that has become one of
the largest sources of finance since the s. The very same globalist nonstate
actors lambasted by Russian elites as threatening the dominance of states in the
international system are today too deeply engrained in—and too politically and
economically necessary for—every country engaged in the global economy for
their power and presence to be rolled back by a single state, or even a coalition
of states. Their clout, together with still robust multilateral institutions and the
globalization of technological development, is likely to temper China’s rejection
of the current global economic system.
Given all of the above, it is not at all clear that Russia can prosper in a more
protectionist global economy, or in one that continues globalizing. Putin’s sover-
eign globalization strategy is too dependent on a world in which Russia is an
energy superpower, oil and gas prices remain high, and technology changes slowly
and is driven mainly by state programs. Such an approach, which has failed
under conditions of global openness, will become all the more difficult in a
world dominated by economic nationalism. Putin’s strategy is also fundamentally
reliant on energy as Russia’s “super power,” a power now eclipsed by the shale-gas
revolution in the United States and new estimates of large Chinese shale-gas
reserves. Russia’s energy-export-based economy is also vulnerable to the impact
of a global shift to cleaner fuels, and its own stagnating population makes the
Russian market too small to galvanize high levels of economic growth. Russia’s
economic pivot to Asia is further complicated by its lack of population and infra-
structure in its Far East, while China faces the need for more resource-rich land
for its burgeoning population. In-migration of Chinese nationals has already pro-
ceeded to such an extent that a Chinese national became mayor of a Russian city.
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None of this gives Russia a durable footing among the world’s advanced
economies.
The final challenge for Russia in promoting a new state-centric order is one of
its own making. Putin has very successfully fostered a conservative and xenopho-
bic nationalism at home over the past decade. More recently, Russia has sponsored
far-right nationalism and distrust of government in the West. One could locate
evidence of this strategy’s success in the vote for Brexit, the increased seats of far-
right parties in European parliaments, and the outcome of the  U.S. presiden-
tial election. But this would be attributing too much foresight and influence to
Russia, as the forces that brought about the massive increase in global prosperity
in the last forty years are the same that have created rising inequality. Together
with increased climate-induced conflict and migration, these have created a polit-
ical backlash against the establishment political parties that have failed to address
them. Thus, while ethno-nationalism is on the rise, it is a mistake to give Russia
too much credit for the effects of broader economic and climatological forces that
have generated population movement on a scale unseen since the great migrations
of the nineteenth century.
In seeking to unleash nationalism, Russia is playing a dangerous game it has
never in its long history mastered. Putin is more likely to resemble Russia’s last
Tsar, Nicholas II, whose empire crumbled in the face of economic inequality
and repressed democratic aspirations. Putin hopes that fomenting conservative
nationalism can hold off the democratic stirrings unleashed in  when he
announced he would return to the Kremlin. He has taken great pains to instill
patriotic nationalism as the ideal that unifies the eighty-five titular nations of
the Russian Federation and to wed them to “leader democracy” and “managed
capitalism.” Yet such nationalism is precisely what ended both the imperial age,
which official Russia pines for, and the Soviet Union. Playing the nationalism
game is sooner to unravel the Russian Federation, as well as China and India,
than it is to overturn the Western capitalist order. Unlike these three multilingual,
multiethnic, multi-confessional former empires, the West has had the bitter expe-
rience of two devastating world wars and has built a regional and global order to
overcome the nationalist forces that threaten democracy and market capitalism.
Despite its current problems, the West has a well-honed toolkit for overcoming
such threats in the form of the multilateral economic and political institutions
that formed the post–World War II order. Russia, by contrast, stirs a beehive
by fostering nationalism at home. In the medium term, Russia’s turn to Asia
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for its export markets may generate anti-Chinese and anti-Asian sentiment among
the elite and broader society. Such sentiment appeared immediately after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, when conservative and nationalist media outlets warned
of a “yellow peril” invading the Russian Far East, and continued a subterranean
existence in the form of daily violence against Asians in Russia’s cities. It is
more likely that nationalism will fracture Russia’s relations with both Europe
and China in ways that harm Russia’s economic prospects more than it harms
either Europe or China. That fracturing in turn could tip the world again into a
great-power war, but one that begins in Eurasia. And it would make Russia,
and most other countries, much poorer.
Conclusion
As noted, while Russian leaders are clearly dissatisfied with the United States and
the European Union, they are not inherently opposed to a liberal world order. The
question of Russia’s desire to change a liberal international order hangs on the
type of liberalism embedded in that order. The liberalism of Enlightenment ratio-
nality, popular sovereignty, and normative legalism enshrined in the United
Nations system are familiar and welcome principles to Russia, ones that it has
claimed to uphold since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia therefore
would likely be content with a return to the post–World War II great-power man-
agement system and the liberal pluralism of the United Nations and the Bretton
Woods era—if the United States were only to abide by its rules and respect
Russia’s great-power rights to its sphere of influence.
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